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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to provide new evidence on the factors affecting wine prices on both 
methodological and factual grounds. On the methodological ground, this study is the first to apply 
a general Box-Cox transformation within the context of hedonic models which exploit all the 
variables (objective and sensorial characteristics, reputation) pointed out by previous literature as 
relevant in driving market prices. On the factual ground, the paper fills the lack of empirical 
evidence on the issue for Italy, one of the leading wine producers, by using a large dataset on two 
premium quality wines (Barolo and Barbaresco) covering the 1995-1998 vintages. Our results 
support the evidence obtained using data from other countries, showing that sensorial traits, the 
reputation of wines and producers, as well as objective variables are all important factors 
influencing the consumers’ willingness to pay. More importantly, by resorting to a non-nested 
statistical test (Vuong, 1989) we compare two alternative specifications (taste vs. reputation) and 
find that the reputation model significantly outperforms the taste one, whereby suggesting that a 
greater amount of information on how the wine price is formed is contained in the reputation 
specification. 
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1. Introduction 
The so-called hedonic price technique relates the price of a differentiated product to its 
characteristics, whereby allowing an estimate of the consumers’ evaluation of the latter. 
Classic applications of this technique have analysed durable goods, such as cars, 
computers, and houses. However, in the last decade hedonic price analyses have been 
performed also for some non-durable goods, in particular wine. Whereas wine is a 
widely differentiated product and therefore a suitable candidate for this sort of empirical 
studies, it is difficult to identify the proper characteristics which affect prices. The 
relevant characteristics could relate to tasting properties (the so-called sensorial 
variables), such as the wine’s aroma, body, and finish. However, these variables could 
be hardly recognised by consumers, in particular in advance with respect to purchase (in 
fact, wine is an experience good). Given the imperfect information setting, other kinds 
of variables – such as reputation and observable traits appearing on the label – become 
additional candidates as determinants of wine price. 
 Not surprisingly, the very few hedonic analyses carried out so far on wine have 
explained price formation with different sets of variables. Broadly speaking, two 
different approaches have been followed. The first one (Combris et al. 1997, 2000) 
examines the role of wine’s sensorial characteristics as opposed to observable 
“objective” attributes such as vintage, denomination, grape variety and the like, which 
usually appear on the label. This approach claims that consumers recognize the latter 
more easily, so that the former tends to be insignificant in determining the market price. 
The second approach (Landon and Smith; 1997, 1998) points out the importance of the 
reputation of wines and producers among consumers. Imperfect information (Akerlof, 
1970) could be overcome if producers acquire reputation over time, so that expected 
wine quality could be proxied by long-term reputation. In turn, reputation would 
influence market prices and it would seem economically far more important than 
current quality as measured by overall sensory quality scores (e.g. evaluation given by 
professional tasters, as for example those provided by Wine Spectator magazine). To the 
best of our knowledge, no previous paper has attempted to jointly use all these kinds of 
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 2
variables (objective, sensorial, reputation, and quality) in order to assess their relative 
importance. 
 The main purpose of this paper is to try to fill this gap and compare the relative 
importance of sensorial characteristics and reputation variables, taking into account the 
effect of objective traits. To this end, we exploit a unique data set on two Italian 
premium wines (Barolo and Barbaresco) produced in a very restricted area in the 
Piedmont region in Northern Italy. Compared with those used by previous literature, our 
dataset enjoys at least two advantages. Firstly, it contains all the variables which might 
influence wine price. Secondly, observations are very homogeneous, in terms of both 
origin and characteristics, whereby allowing us to focus on single producer and single 
wine reputation instead of collective reputation (i.e. reputation of groups of producers 
and wines). As a secondary purpose, our analysis intends to provide evidence on the 
factors driving wine price also for Italy which, in spite of its leading role as a wine 
producer, has not been so far the object of empirical analyses. 
 By way of anticipation, our results show that all various kinds of variables, except 
current quality, play an important role in explaining market prices. More importantly, 
we find that a hedonic model including objective and reputation variables outperforms, 
on statistical grounds, a model with objective and sensorial characteristics. In turn, this 
suggests that a greater amount of information on how the wine price is formed is 
contained in the reputation specification. 
 The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section motivates this paper by 
reviewing the relevant previous literature on hedonic price in the wine industry. Section 
3 presents the main characteristics of the two wines and describes the dataset used. 
Section 4 specifies the empirical strategy whereas section 5 presents the ensuing 
econometric results. Section 6 provides some final remarks and a data appendix 
concludes the paper. 
2. Motivation and previous literature 
Since the seminal contributions by Griliches (1971) and Rosen (1974), several papers 
have estimated, using the hedonic price technique, the implicit prices of some 
characteristics which differentiate closely related products. In order to illustrate the 
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approach in the simplest possible manner, let us consider two units of a given good that 
are identical except for a particular attribute. One would expect their prices to differ. If 
consumers place a value on this characteristic, the difference in market price between 
the two units should, ceteris paribus, express their willingness to pay for an 
improvement in the attribute. More generally, it is possible to isolate the contribution of 
various factors to the market price through the use of econometric techniques.1  
Not surprisingly, these studies have mostly used data on housing (e.g. Brookshire 
et al., 1981; Can, 1992), cars (e.g. Griliches 1971; Murray and Sarantis, 1999), and 
personal computers (e.g. Chow, 1967; Berndt and Griliches, 1990; Baker, 1997) which 
lend themselves to this kind of analysis being highly differentiated and with easy-to-
identify characteristics. In recent years, however, researchers have also analysed the 
relationship between prices and characteristics for some non-durable goods. In 
particular, a few papers have recently estimated hedonic price functions for the wine 
industry, as wine is highly differentiated and then suitable for hedonic analyses. 
Generally speaking, three main types of variables appear in the specification of hedonic 
models for the wine price. A first basic category embraces the so-called objective 
characteristics – such as the wine’s year of vintage, denomination (i.e. whether the wine 
comes from a particular “cru”), region, or grape variety – which usually appear on the 
label and are therefore easy to identify by consumers. The two remaining sets of 
variables relate to wine quality. In fact, a peculiar feature of wine is that quality 
attributes, reasonably expected to affect consumer preferences and then market prices, 
are not easy to evaluate objectively. To this regard, previous literature has focused on 
two broad groups of variables which are related to quality evaluations, inserting them 
into hedonic regressions alongside with objective characteristics. 
                                                 
1 Formally, following Johansson (1987), suppose any unit x of a given good can be completely described 
by k characteristics. Then the price of this good is a function of its attributes: 
xCCfP xkxxx  allfor     ),...,( 1=  
where C denotes good’s characteristics. This is a hedonic or implicit price function. In fact, this function 
is a locus of equilibrium consumers’ marginal willignesses to pay for improvements in the k attributes of 
good x. 
Supposing that a particular form of the hedonic function has been estimated, the coefficient for the partial 
derivative with respect to the jth characteristic  
)( xjxC
xj
x Cf
C
P =∂
∂  
indicates the increase in market equilibrium expenditure on good x that is required to obtain the good with 
one more unit of attribute Cxj (for more details on this issue see Freeman, 1979). 
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 4
A first approach rests on the argument that wine quality is generally recognized to 
depend on sensory evaluations. Although tastes are intrinsically subjective, wine experts 
claim that few codified characteristics univocally determine the quality of the wine and, 
in turn, its price. These codified characteristics are the so-called sensorial variables such 
as the wine’s aroma, finish or harmony of components. According to this line of 
reasoning, Combris et al. (1997, 2000) use data for Bordeaux and Burgundy wine to 
estimate a hedonic price function and what is referred to as a jury grade equation to 
explain the variation in price and quality respectively. In both studies sensorial 
characteristics are found to be important in determining wine quality, while price is 
strongly explained by objective attributes appearing on the label of the bottle. As for the 
role of sensorial variables in price formation, the evidence is partially inconclusive. 
Indeed, unlike the Bordeaux study where most of sensorial characteristics have poor 
relevance, results of the Burgundy analysis show three sensorial attributes (acidity, fat, 
and concentration) having a significant impact on the wine price in all estimates. 
Notwithstanding, the authors conclude that consumers may decide to vary their 
willingness to pay for wine primarily according to observable attributes.2 In fact, given 
the context of imperfect information, objective characteristics (in particular ranking and 
vintage) are much easier and less costly to identify by consumers than sensorial 
attributes.3 
A second approach emphasizes the importance of the reputation of wines and 
producers among consumers. Imperfect information could be overcome if producers 
acquire reputation over time, so that well-established or expected wine quality could be 
proxied by long-term reputation, which, in turn, would influence market prices. 
Furthermore, current quality could be proxied by overall sensory quality score measures 
from widely accessible published wine guides. However, consumers may not possess 
this information before price is determined and whether this information increases 
consumers’ knowledge of the product is therefore unclear. Following this line of 
reasoning, Landon and Smith (1997) use an unbalanced panel of 196 red wines (559 
observations) from the five Bordeaux vintages of 1987 to 1991 and estimate two 
hedonic price equations. The first equation includes only objective variables and an 
                                                 
2 The relevance of the objective traits is also underlined in Oczkowski (1994).  
3 Indeed, the acquisition of information about sensorial variables would require tasting, learning, and 
buying wine guides. 
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overall sensory quality index; the second one considers observable characteristics and 
reputation variables, the latter being referred to both single wines (individual reputation) 
and groups of wines (collective reputation). Apart from confirming the relevance of the 
objective traits, the authors find that long-term reputation explains much more variation 
in the consumers’ willingness to pay than does short-term quality changes and that 
ignoring reputation indicators leads to overstate the impact of current quality on market 
price. This finding has been corroborated by focusing only on a balanced panel of 151 
wines for the 1989 and 1990 vintages (Landon and Smith, 1998).4 Subsequent 
applications to Australian premium wines by Oczkowski (2001) and to premium wines 
from North America, Australia, South Africa and Chile by Schamel (2000) support the 
presence of significant reputation effects. However, while Oczkowski’s results indicate 
an irrelevant impact of current quality, the econometric evidence in Schamel points to 
highly significant implicit prices also for overall sensory wine quality. 
 Summing up, the previous literature on hedonic wine prices has alternatively 
employed, in addition to objective characteristics, sensorial and reputation variables in 
order to take into account the effects of quality attributes. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no study has so far attempted to jointly use both types of factors to assess 
their relative importance in determining market prices. As a consequence, whether taste 
or reputation is more relevant in explaining wine price is still unclear. To shed light on 
the issue, this paper exploits a very rich dataset embracing information on all kinds of 
aforementioned variables for two premium Italian wines: Barolo and Barbaresco. The 
description of the dataset is the object of the next section. 
3. Data Description 
3.1. The Barolo and Barbaresco wines 
The present paper exploits a unique dataset collecting data on two premium Italian red 
wines: Barolo and Barbaresco. Although the former is more widely known than the 
latter, these two wines have several common features whereby justifying the joint 
                                                 
4 In this study expected quality is explicitely assumed to depend on reputation according to a forecasting 
equation which is estimated jointly with the hedonic price function, the latter having as arguments current 
quality and expected quality. 
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 6
analysis put forth in this paper. In particular, the Disciplinary Texts of their 
“Denominazione d’Origine Controllata e Garantita” (DOCG) label specifies that the 
basic grape must be the same for both wines (the Nebbiolo variety). Furthermore, both 
wines come from the same area in the Piedmont region in Northern Italy, the Langhe, 
which is quite restricted (only 1,930 hectares). In turn, the amount produced is very 
small (approximately 12 million bottles per year) and the two wines display quite 
similar sensorial characteristics and vintage quality.5 The most noteworthy differences 
between the two wines concern the maturing process imposed by the Disciplinary Texts 
(2 years for the Barbaresco wine and 3 for Barolo) and the production areas, very close 
to each other but carried out in different villages. 
 The production of Barolo and Barbaresco wines is very fragmented, due to the 
large number of landowners: there are approximately 750 producers of Barolo and 380 
producers of Barbaresco. The combined effect of the small overall quantity and the 
large number of producers results in a very low output per firm: in fact, only 4.15% of 
Barolo winemakers produce more than 100,000 bottles and this figure reduces to 2% for 
Barbaresco. 
3.2. The variables 
The variables used in this paper have been collected by inspecting several published 
sources and through direct or phone interviews with the wine producers carried out 
during the July – September 2002 period.6 
 In particular, our starting point in constructing the database has been the analysis 
of two leading wine guides: Wine Spectator, probably the best known wine guide which 
has also been used by some previous literature (e.g. Landon and Smith; 1997, 1998), 
and the Duemila Vini guide edited by the Italian Association of Sommeliers 
(professional wine tasters, AIS henceforth). Both guides might be reasonably supposed 
                                                 
5 For comparison purposes, consider that the Bordeaux region is much wider (250,000 hectars), 
production is larger (approximately 660 million bottles) and uses five different grape varieties. 
6 For more detailed information on variable definition and sources refer to the Appendix 1 at the end of 
the paper. For descriptive statistics on the variables see Table 1. For more details on data collection and 
variable caracteristics see Sacchetto (2002). 
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to be independent from wine producers and therefore represent reliable sources of 
information.7 
 We identified all the Barolo and Barbaresco wines cited in the two guides for the 
1995-97 vintages for Barolo and the 1996-98 vintages for Barbaresco (i.e. the last three 
vintages for which information was available in 2002). We kept only those 227 wines 
for which data were available for at least two of the three years (603 observations, 111 
different producers). Henceforth, we will use the term “bottle” to identify a specific 
producer-wine-year observation. 
 From these two guides we retrieved information on several variables of interest. 
Firstly, Wine Spectator reports an overall judgement of the wine, ranging from a 
minimum of 50 to a maximum of 100 (variable VSPE). Secondly, from the AIS guide 
we derived wines’ alcoholic gradation (ALC). Finally, from both guides we derived: i) 
data on quantity produced (BOTT); ii) a specific judgement on six sensorial traits for 
each wine (INTE, FINE, COMP, HARM, TANI, FINI); iii) three objective variables, 
namely vintage (AN97), type, i.e. whether the wine is a Barolo or a Barbaresco (TYPE), 
and denomination, i.e. whether the label identifies a particular “cru” (DEN). It is 
worthwhile to give some details about the three objective traits and their expected 
impact on wine price. As for vintage, all the four years considered in this paper (1995–
1998) are good quality vintages. However, 1997 is unanimously considered the best 
year and therefore is the only vintage we single out through a dummy variable (AN97) 
in the econometric analysis to check the presence of a positive effect on market price. 
The variable TYPE is included in the hedonic model to take into account that, in spite of 
the common high quality standard, Barolo wine is more widely known than Barbaresco 
and this circumstance could lead to a higher willingness to pay for the former. Finally, 
the mark on the label of a special denomination (“cru”) in addition to DOCG, such as, 
                                                 
7 Combris et al. (1997, p. 392) rigthly point out that wine guides might suffer from some drawbacks when 
used as sources for estimating edonic price equations. In particular, guides tend to overrepresent good 
wines and condition purchases might be different. As for overrepresentation of good quality wines, this 
is unlikely to occurr in our sample, as it is drawn from a populaton of high quality wines and the median 
price in the sample is 26 euros, which shows that low and medium price wines are well represented in 
our sample. Furthermore, selling prices in our sample are fairly homogeneous, as they all have been 
collected through direct or phone interviews with the producers (see the data appendix). Unfortunately, 
the same sort of controlled experiment Combris et al. (1997, 2000) have relied upon is not available, to 
the best of our knowledge, for Barolo and Barbaresco wines. We thank an anonimous referee for raising 
this point. 
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 8
for instance, the origin from particular vineyards, is likely to represent an important 
distinction factor for consumers, able to push wine price upward. 
 The very localised production area allowed us to keep also direct and phone 
interviews with producers. Through these contacts we recovered information on prices 
and on whether wine passed an aging period in barrique barrels. In particular, we asked 
producers to report the retail price at which they would sell the bottles directly to the 
consumer in their estate wineshop, tax included. Inspection of Table 1, which presents 
the descriptive statistics for the variables, reveals the very large variability in price, 
which ranges from 11.5 to 93 euros per bottle. Barrique barrels are smaller and 
manufactured from higher quality oak than traditional ones, so that they convey a 
special taste to the wine. Several producers nowadays blend wine aged in these barrels 
with wine aged in traditional barrels. As this information is not reported in the guides 
(nor on the label) we asked producers whether their wine contains wine aged in 
barrique barrels.8 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Finally, we relied on wine publications to construct two crucial groups of 
variables, those linked with the reputation of wines and producers. As for single wine 
reputation, we used three widely known Italian guides (I vini di Veronelli by Veronelli, 
Guida dei Vini Italiani by Maroni, and Guida ai Vini d’Italia by AA. VV.) to construct 
three bottle-specific dummy variables (ECVER, ECMAR, ECGAM, respectively) 
representing single wine reputation among consumers. In fact, these guides select, 
according to various criteria, “best” wines, which soon become well known among 
consumers. Each of our dummies takes a value of 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the bottle has 
been selected as one of these “best” wines. We include all the three variables as guides 
might differ in their judgment, so that the choice of “best” wines differ from one guide 
to the other, but all of them represent a noteworthy source of information for consumers. 
As far as the reputation of producers is concerned, we constructed three producer-
specific time-invariant variables. The first one, labeled FIT, represents producers’ 
reputation in Italy: it is the number of excellence ratings given by the Guida ai Vini 
                                                 
8 The direct contact with producers allowed us also to check data on the quantity produced and to fill 
some missing values in the alcoholic gradation. 
Page 10 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 9 
 
d’Italia publication over the 1987-2002 period to any wine (not only Barolo and 
Barbaresco) of a single producer9. Likewise, the variable PREST captures producers’ 
reputation abroad: it is the number of ratings provided to each producer by the Wine 
Spectator magazine. Finally, we constructed a dummy variable (FAMA) which takes a 
value of 1 only for producers ranked in some well known charts (see the Appendix 1 for 
further details). 
4. Empirical strategy 
Although the hedonic price technique has been widely used in the empirical applications 
to study the process of price formation in several markets, economic theory provides 
little guidance about the functional form of the dependence of price on good’s attributes. 
The research strategy followed by the previous literature on the wine industry is 
characterized by the preliminary choice of the hedonic price model to estimate (i.e. 
sensorial or reputation), and the subsequent selection of the appropriate functional form 
(e.g. log-log, log-linear, reciprocal, and the like) according to some specification tests 
(e.g. the Reset test). The present study sharply departs from this strategy, as we neither 
select ex ante the model type nor its functional form. 
 More specifically, the research line of this paper relies on three steps. We firstly 
estimate different Box-Cox transformations (Box and Cox, 1964) of the dependent and 
independent variables for each of the two models suggested by previous literature (the 
Combris et al. specification – CLV henceforth – and the Landon & Smith one – LS 
henceforth). This allows us to screen among different models without imposing any 
structure a priori, so that the data can suggest the proper specification of the hedonic 
price function10. We then select the best sensorial and the best reputation model on the 
                                                 
9 This guide has been preferred to the other two (I vini di Veronelli and Guida ai vini d’Italia) for several 
reasons: it is the best known, it covers the largest set of wines, and it is the most selective in providing 
excellence ratings. 
10 Our choice to start from a linear Box-Cox approximation is motivated by both previous empirical 
research and theoretical arguments. Goodman (1978) – one of the first applications of the Box-Cox 
transformation within the context of hedonic prices – finds that a simple linear specification is generally 
rejected in favor of the Box-Cox model. Cropper et al. (1988) compare through a Monte Carlo analysis 
the behavior of six different hedonic price specifications (linear, semi-log, log-log, quadratic, linear and 
quadratic Box-Cox), with regressors either perfectly observed or proxied (as in our case). The authors 
point out the superior performance of the linear Box-Cox regression which is “the functional form of 
choice when estimating hedonic price functions” (p. 675). On the theoretical side, log linear models imply 
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 10
basis of standard likelihood ratio (LR) statistics. In the second step, we simplify the two 
preferred models by applying zero-restrictions LR tests on coefficients. As the 
simplified best models are non-nested, in the final stage we compare them through the 
Vuong (1989) test. 
 In the first stage, we consider several variants of the Box-Cox transformations. 
The most general model we estimate is: 
 ( ) εγβ λθ ++= ∑∑
∈∈
kk
Kk
jj
Jj
xxp )(  [1] 
where V (b) – for a generic variable V = p, x and a generic parameter b = θ, λ – denotes 
the Box-Cox metric 
 




→
≠−=
,0for         ln
0for     1
)(
bV
b
b
V
V
b
b  [1b] 
J is the set of regressors xj which can be sensibly logged, K is the set of regressors xk 
which cannot sensibly logged (including variables such as constant term, dummies, time 
trends, etc.), and jβ  ( kγ ) is the coefficient associated with variable xj (xk). Statistical 
noise is represented byε , a i.i.d. normally distributed random variable with 0 mean and 
variance 2σ . The crucial feature of this model is that both regressand (p) and at least a 
set of regressors (J) are transformed through a different Box-Cox parameter (θ and λ 
respectively). We will refer to this model as THETA. 
 A slightly less general specification than [1] is as follows: 
 ( ) εγβ λλ ++= ∑∑
∈∈
kk
Kk
jj
Jj
xxp )(  [2] 
where both regressand and at least a set of regressors are transformed through the same 
Box-Cox parameter (λ). We will refer to model [2] as LAMBDA.  
 Proceeding with further simplifications, we can imagine to transform only (a set 
of) regressors or the regressand only, leading to the following specifications: 
                                                                                                                                               
the quite restrictive assumption that variation in marginal attribute prices occurr only through variation in 
selling price but not through variation in attribute quantity. In other words, two wines sold at the same 
price will have the same vector of marginal attribute prices, even if those wines have very different 
attribute bundles (on this issue see Rasmussen and Zuehlke, 1990). 
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 ( ) εγβ λ ++= ∑∑
∈∈
kk
Kk
jj
Jj
xxp  [3] 
 εγβθ ++= ∑∑
∈∈
kk
Kk
jj
Jj
xxp )(  [4] 
Again, we will refer to model [3] as LIN-RHS and to model [4] as LHS-LIN. 
 Note finally that model [1] can be further simplified by letting θ = λ = 0 (LOG-LOG 
model), θ = λ = 1 (LIN-LIN model), θ = 0(LOG-RHS model) and λ = 0 (LHS-LOG model). 
 All eight models (models [1]-[4] and the four LOG and LIN transformations) have 
been estimated for both the CLV and the LS specifications. Variables common to all 
models are the objective and other characteristics (AN97, TYPE, ALC, and DEN; BOTT 
and BARR).11 We included only INTE, FINE, COMP, HARM, TANI, FINI (sensorial 
characteristics) in the CLV models and only VSPE (current quality)12, ECGAM, 
ECMAR, ECVER (individual wine reputation), FIT, PREST, FAMA (individual producer 
reputation) in the LS specifications. Notice that the set of transformed variables J 
includes ALC, BOTT, VSPE, FIT and PREST, whereas the remaining regressors belong 
to the set K of untransformed variables.13 Once we have estimated all the 16 hedonic 
models, we select the one best fitting the data within each category (CLV, LS) using 
standard LR tests. 
 For the sake of parsimony, in the second stage we simplify the two preferred CLV 
and LS specifications through a stepwise procedure: we gradually delete the least 
significant variable and stop only when all the est mated coefficients for retained 
regressors are significant at least at the 5% level. 
                                                 
11 The number of bottles sold and ageing in barrique are not objective variables as they do not appear 
systematically on the label. Their expected effect on price is uncertain. The number of bottles can play the 
role of snob variable exerting a positive impact on price insofar as consumers value the rarity of the wine, 
but it can also be viewed as a means of diffusion of wine reputation. Ageing in barrique gives wine a 
particular flavour, which might be valued positively or not by consumers. 
12 In a preliminary regression we checked that wine quality (VSPE) is well explained by the sensorial 
characteristics. These results, available upon request to the authors, confirm that the Wine Spectator rating 
is given on the basis of some widely recognised and objective criteria, whereby justifying the use of this 
variable in the price equations. 
13 To avoid tranformations of zero values, we replaced the variables FIT with (FIT + 1) and PREST with 
(PREST + 1). Furthermore, we estimated all models by standardizing the dependent variable by its 
geometric mean. As discussed, among the others, in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, chapter 14), this 
transformation does not affect the values of the estimated λ and θ. However, it does affect the values of β 
and γ ; therefore, in testing the significance of these coefficients we will rely on LR and not on Wald tests 
which, as is well known, are not invariant with respect to non-linear transformations of the variables. 
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 12
 Finally, we resort to the Vuong (1989) test to compare the best simplified models. 
As suggested by Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong (1992), this statistic must be adjusted to 
take into account the different number of parameters included in the compared models. 
Three adjustments have been proposed by the literature, differing in the penalties for the 
number of estimated parameters, namely the Hannan and Quinn (1979), the Akaike 
(1973), and the Schwarz (1978) correction factors. In order to check the robustness of 
our results, we decided to apply all the three adjustments. We will refer to these 
corrected statistics as “Vuong Adjusted Likelihood Ratio” (VALR). 
5. Results 
All the models above have been estimated by Maximum Likelihood with the Stata 
software, version 9.2. The results are presented in Tables 2 to 8. 
 Estimates of the eight Box-Cox specifications for the CLV-type hedonic equation 
(or sensorial model) are shown in Table 2. Both parameters of the general model 
(THETA) have reasonable magnitude and are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Proceeding across the possible simplifications, we notice that the estimated parameter θ 
(i.e. the one transforming the dependent variable p) proves to be quite stable (values 
ranging from -0.52 and -0.50), whereas the estimates of λ (the parameter transforming 
the independent variables) show high variability. Comparisons between the THETA 
model and its various simplifications are presented in Table 3. Not surprisingly, all the 
specification where the transformation of regressand is restricted to a given value (LIN-
RHS, LOG-LOG, LIN-LIN, LOG-RHS) are strongly rejected whereas the chi-squared statistic 
for the other models is much lower. Notwithstanding, the only specification not rejected 
at the 10% level is the LAMBDA model. 
[INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
As for the LS-type hedonic equation (or reputation model), estimates of the Box-
Cox transformations reported in Table 4 reveal remarkable differences with respect to 
those of the CLV-type models. In fact, in the THETA specification the transformation of 
the independent variables (λ) is 0.49 and proves to be statistically significant, whereas 
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the parameter θ is fairly small in value and insignificant. Again, the estimates for 
parameter θ are quite robust across the different specification and close to zero, while λ 
shows larger variability (ranging between 0.06 and 1.27). LR tests comparing general 
and restricted specifications (see Table 5) clearly favour the LOG-RHS model where the 
value of θ  is constrained to be zero. 
[INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
We then simplified the two preferred Box-Cox transformations for the CLV 
(LAMBDA) and LS (LOG-RHS) specifications by applying the stepwise procedure 
described above. Coefficients estimates for the general and simplified versions of the 
two models are presented in Table 6. As the values of retained explanatory variables are 
very similar in both cases, we will comment only upon the results of the restricted 
versions. 
[INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE] 
The estimated parameters for the CLV (LAMBDA) hedonic model (third column) 
support the importance of both the objective and the sensorial variables. In fact, the 
dummies for the 1997 vintage (AN97 = 1), for Barolo wines (TYPE = 1), and for a 
special denomination (DEN = 1) turn out to be positive and significant at the 2% level, 
whereby confirming our a priori. Turning to the sensorial characteristics, the only 
significant one is the harmony among wine components (HARM): this finding can be 
explained as this trait is the easiest among the sensorial ones to be recognised by 
consumers. Finally, the number of bottles (BOTT) exerts a positive and significant 
impact on prices. 
The fifth column of Table 6 presents the results of the LS (LOG-RHS) hedonic 
model. All coefficients have the expected sign. Moreover, the variables representing 
individual wine reputation (ECGAM, ECVER, ECMAR) and producer reputation (FIT, 
FAMA, PREST) are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Estimated coefficients for 
objective and other characteristics have the same sign as those of CLV (LAMBDA) 
model, the only exceptions being the dummy for the use of barrique barrels (BARR), 
which turns out to exert a positive impact on prices, and the quantity produced (BOTT), 
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 14
which proves to have a negative sign. These findings suggest that in a model with only 
objective and reputation but no taste variables, barrique becomes positive and 
statistically significant as it conveys information of better wine flavour. The role of the 
number of bottles appear to differ according to the other covariates in the model: once 
taste variables are accounted for, it seems to play a reputation effect whereas it plays a 
“snob” effect due to the limited availability of a particular bottle in a reputation model. 
 Table 7 shows the marginal effects of the variables included in the restricted CLV 
and LS models on price14. Rather comfortably, impacts are precisely estimated and turn 
out to be quite similar for those regressors appearing in both specifications. Extra price 
consumers are willing to pay ranges from 1 to 7.2 Euros for objective and other 
attributes (bottle aged in barrique barrels, 1997 vintage, special denomination, Barolo 
wine). As for sensorial traits, an increase in harmony from a medium to a high level 
(from 2 to 3) is valued more than 4 Euros. Single wine reputation factors (ECGAM, 
ECMAR, ECVER) prove to exert marginal effects of similar magnitude (2.5, 3.4, 2.9 
Euros respectively), whereas the variable implying the largest variation in the 
willingness to pay is by far FAMA (12.8 Euros). The latter result confirms how 
important is the inclusion of a producer in some well known charts from a consumer 
perspective.15 
 Finally, we proceeded to perform the main purpose of this study, namely the 
comparison of the relative importance of sensorial and reputation factors in determining 
market prices. To this end, we ran a Vuong (1989) test for non-nested models. In order 
to take into account the different number of estimated parameters in the CLV (LAMBDA) 
and LS (LOG-RHS) specifications, we adjusted the test statistic using the three correction 
factors mentioned above – Hannan and Quinn (1979), Akaike (1973), and Schwarz 
(1978) – and obtained the VALR values reported in Table 8. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
14 We followed Abrevaya (2002) in using the so-called smearing technique, which provides consistent 
estimators, to measure marginal effects. We also bootstrapped the (higly non-linear) marginal effects to 
compute standard errors. Further details on formulas and software program used are available upon 
request to the authors. 
15 Marginal effects for continuous variables (BOTT, FIT, and PREST) have no direct interpretation, as 
they depend on their unit of measurement. We therefore computed the economic impact of each 
attribute as the difference of the expected value of the dependent variable at the 10th and at the 90th 
percentile of each regressor distribution. In all cases the increase in wine price turned out to be small 
(below 1 euro). 
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Inspection of VALR-statistics reveals that, even applying the correction factor 
according the highest penalty for the number of estimated parameters (Schwarz, 1979), 
the model LS (LOG-RHS) significantly outperforms the CLV (LAMBDA) specification, the 
P-value of the test being always less than 1%. This leads to conclude that the former 
model is closer than the latter to the true model which generates the data and therefore 
contains a greater amount of information about the wine price formation. In turn, this 
finding points to a major role of reputation compared with sensorial traits in explaining 
differences in the consumers’ willingness to pay. 
6. Final remarks 
This paper aimed at providing new empirical evidence on factors affecting wine prices 
on both methodological and factual grounds. In particular, building on previous 
literature, which highlighted the importance of objective, sensorial, and reputation 
variables, the study intended to assess the role played by sensorial characteristics versus 
reputation, taking into account the effect of objective variables. To this end, we focused 
on two premium Italian red wines, Barolo and Barbaresco, whereby filling the gap of no 
empirical evidence on the issue for Italy, and constructed, through the inspection of 
wine publications as well as interviews with producers, a database which collects all 
these sorts of variables. 
 The results from the general Box-Cox estimation of different sensorial (CLV) and 
reputation (LS) models, which does not impose a priori restrictions on the form of the 
hedonic price function, confirm previous evidence obtained using data from countries 
other than Italy: the consumers’ choice with respect to wine is a quite complex process 
which involves a variety of factors such as objective characteristics, sensorial traits, and 
reputation. However, on the basis of a non-nested statistical test (Vuong, 1989), the LS 
specification is to be preferred to the CLV one. As a consequence, we can infer that, 
although both sets of variables are relevant factors influencing consumers’ preferences 
and their willingness to pay, the reputation acquired by wines and producers during the 
years is more important than taste in driving market prices. 
 The results we obtained have some relevant implications for firms’ strategy. 
Producers’ marketing has been recently directed toward the search of an increased 
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quality in terms of improved taste characteristics. Although our findings show that 
consumers to some extent appreciate these improvements, they foremost suggest that 
producers should aim at building a well established reputation – both at wine and at firm 
level – by promotional activities (e.g. participation to wine exhibitions) which facilitate 
citations in well known guides. 
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7. Data Appendix 
Appendix 1: Variable definition and data sources 
 
ALC: alcoholic content as it appears on the label of the bottle. As imposed from the 
Disciplinary Text for Barolo and Barbaresco, the alcoholic degree reported on the 
label can differ from the actual value determined by chemical analysis by at most 
±0,5% vol. Sources: AA.VV. Duemila vini, Associazione Italiana Sommeliers ed., 
years 2000, 2001, 2002 and direct or phone interviews with producers between July 
and September 2002. 
AN97: a dummy variable which equals 1 if the wine vintage is 1997 and 0 otherwise. 
BARR: a dummy variable which equals 1 if a percentage of the wine passed an aging period 
in barrique barrels and 0 otherwise. Source: direct or phone interviews with 
producers between July and September 2002. 
BOTT: number of bottles produced for each wine in thousands. Sources: AA.VV. Duemila 
vini, Associazione Italiana Sommeliers ed., years 2000, 2001, 2002 and the wine 
ratings database at www.winespectator.com. We checked the information provided 
by Wine Spectator through direct or phone interviews with producers between July 
and September 2002. 
COMP: a dummy variable which reflects the complexity of the aroma. It equals 2 if the 
olfactory characteristic is present, 1 otherwise. Sources: AA.VV. Duemila vini, 
Associazione Italiana Sommeliers ed., years 2000, 2001, 2002 and the wine ratings 
database at www.winespectator.com. 
DEN: a dummy variable which equals 1 if the wine appellation on the label is not just 
“Barolo” or “Barbaresco”, but it contains more information (e.g. the vineyard or the 
indications of the terroir where the grapes are produced, or the word Riserva: these 
dictions have been intended as indicators of a special wine, i.e. a “cru” one) and 0 
otherwise. 
ECGAM: a dummy variable which equals 1 (0 otherwise) if the wine obtained a “Tre 
Bicchieri” award from the Italian wine guidebook “Guida ai Vini d’Italia” during the 
2000-02 period. Sources: AA.VV. Guida ai Vini d'Italia, Gambero Rosso ed., years 
2000, 2001, 2002, and the web site www.gamberorosso.it. 
ECMAR: a dummy variable which equals 1 (0 otherwise) if the wine obtained a rating higher 
than 76/100 from the Italian wine guidebook “Guida dei Vini Italiani” during the 
2000-02 period. This threshold is used by the author to identify “excellent wines”. 
Source: Maroni, L. Guida dei Vini Italiani, LM ed., years 2000, 2001, 2002. 
ECVER: a dummy variable which equals 1 (0 otherwise) if the wine obtained a rating higher 
than 90/100 from the Italian wine guidebook “I vini di Veronelli” during the 2000-02 
period. This threshold is used by the author to identify “excellent wines”. Source: 
Veronelli, L. I vini di Veronelli, Veronelli ed., years 2000, 2001, 2002. 
FAMA: a dummy variable which equals 1 (0 otherwise) if the wine producer has been 
included at least once in one of the following charts: 
Page 19 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 18
 1992-2002 “Top 100” wines of the year chart, yearly published by the Wine 
Spectator Magazine. The source is the wine ratings database at 
www.winespectator.com. 
 “Outstanding Wine” rating in the chart of Piedmont wines made by Robert 
Parker. The sources are the web site www.erobertparker.com and Parker, R. 
Robert Parker’s Wine Buyers’ guide, 2002. 
 the chart proposed by the Italian wine review Civiltà del Bere (April 2002), 
which indicates the wine producers that obtained a rating of excellence in 2002 
from at least three of the five most important Italian wine guidebooks 
(Veronelli, L. I vini di Veronelli; Masnaghetti, A. I Vini d’Italia 2002; Maroni, 
L. Guida dei Vini Italiani; AIS ed., Duemila vini; Gambero Rosso ed., Guida ai 
Vini d'Italia); 
FINE: a dummy variable which equals 2 if the wine is characterized by finesse of aroma, 1 
otherwise. The sources are the same as for COMP. 
FINI: a dummy variable which reflects the persistence of the taste in the finish. It equals 3 
if the finish is long, 2 if it is medium, 1 if it is short. The sources are the same as for 
COMP. 
FIT: total number of “Tre Bicchieri” awarded during the 1987-2002 period to any wine of 
a producer by the Italian wine guidebook “Guida ai Vini d'Italia”. The source is the 
same as for ECGAM. 
HARM: a dummy gustatory variable which contemplates the harmony between the 
components of the wine. It equals 3 if the wine is well balanced, 2 if it is balanced, 1 
if it is unbalanced. The sources are the same as for COMP. 
INTE: a dummy variable which reflects the level of aromatic intensity of the wine. It equals 
3 if the wine’s aroma is strong, 2 if it is classic and 1 if it is discreet. The sources are 
the  same as for COMP. 
p: price per bottle of wine in current Euros. Data have been collected by direct or phone 
interviews with the wine producers during the July – September 2002 period. The 
producers were asked to provide the retail price at which they would sell the wine 
directly to the consumer in their estate wineshop. 
PREST: number of ratings assigned to any wine of a producer during the years by the Wine 
Spectator Magazine. Source: the wine ratings database at www.winespectator.com. 
TANI: a dummy variable which indicates the presence of fine tannins. It equals 2 if there 
are fine tannins, 1 otherwise. The sources are the same as for COMP. 
TYPE: a dummy variable which equals 1 if the wine is a Barolo and 0 if it is a Barbaresco. 
VSPE: a variable which indicates the valuation in a 100 points scale assigned to each bottle 
by the Wine Spectator Magazine if the rating is not missing (452 observations out of 
603). The remaining 151 cases have been adjusted according to two criteria: i) the 
average Wine Spectator rating obtained from the same wine in other vintages; ii) the 
average rating obtained from the same vineyard’s and producer’s wines. Source: the 
wine ratings database at www.winespectator.com. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable Mean St.dev Min Max % = 0 % = 1 % = 2 % = 3
PRICE 
p 28.92 11.55 11.36 93.00 --- --- --- --- 
OBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS 
AN97 --- --- --- --- 65.67 34.33 --- --- 
TYPE --- --- --- --- 28.19 71.81 --- --- 
ALC 13.79 0.36 13.0 14.5 --- --- --- --- 
DEN --- --- --- --- 17.91 82.09 --- --- 
CURRENT QUALITY 
VSPE 89.12 3.97 69 100 --- --- --- --- 
REPUTATION 
 Single wine reputation according to Italian guides: 
ECGAM --- --- --- --- 88.06 11.94 --- --- 
ECMAR --- --- --- --- 85.41 14.59 --- --- 
ECVER --- --- --- --- 69.68 30.02 --- --- 
 Single producer reputation: 
FIT 3.18 4.20 0 29 --- --- --- --- 
PREST 33.02 31.61 0 131 --- --- --- --- 
FAMA --- --- --- --- 86.57 13.43 --- --- 
SENSORIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 Olfactory characteristics: 
INTE --- --- --- --- --- 5.47 49.09 45.44
FINE --- --- --- --- --- 14.10 85.90 --- 
COMP --- --- --- --- --- 22.55 77.45 --- 
 Gustatory characteristics: 
HARM --- --- --- --- --- 2.32 37.31 60.36
TANI --- --- --- --- --- 20.56 79.44 ---
FINI --- --- --- --- --- 7.46 40.13 52.40
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS 
BOTT 15.9 27.8 1 260 --- --- --- --- 
BARR --- --- --- --- 53.07 46.93 --- --- 
Notes: mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum are reported for continuous variables; 
the percentage of observation falling into a given category is provided for discrete variables. 
Price is in current euro. Production is in thousand bottles. The number of observations is 603. 
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Table 2. Sensorial (CLV) model estimates for different Box-Cox transformations 
Specification Box-Cox parameters P-value Log L 
θ, λ [THETA] λ =   2.28 θ = - 0.52 
0.025 
0.000 -152.96 
θ = λ [LAMBDA] λ = - 0.52 0.000 -153.69 
θ = 1, λ [LIN-RHS] λ = - 0.92 0.043 -284.16 
θ, λ = 1 [LHS-LIN] θ = - 0.52 0.000 -154.57 
θ = λ = 0 [LOG-LOG] --- --- -169.36 
θ = λ = 1 [LIN-LIN] --- --- -288.92 
θ = 0, λ [LOG-RHS] λ =  2.52 0.048 -168.35 
θ, λ = 0 [LHS-LOG] θ = - 0.50 0.000 -155.25 
Note: we report p-values of the null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to 0. 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison among sensorial (CLV) specifications by LR test 
 Model [.]  versus  Model [.] χ2-statistic P-value 
[LAMBDA]  versus  [THETA] 1.47 0.226 
[LIN-RHS]  versus  [THETA] 262.4 0.000 
[LHS-LIN]  versus  [THETA] 3.24 0.072 
[LOG-LOG]  versus  [THETA] 32.82 0.000 
[LIN-LIN]  versus  [THETA] 271.93 0.000 
[LOG-RHS]  versus  [THETA] 30.79 0.000 
[LHS-LOG]  versus  [THETA] 4.58 0.032 
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Table 4. Reputation (LS) model estimates for different Box-Cox transformations 
Specification Box-Cox parameters P-value Log L 
θ, λ [THETA] λ =   0.49 θ = - 0.05 
0.000 
0.572 68.88 
θ = λ [LAMBDA] λ =  0.06 0.453 63.61 
θ = 1, λ [LIN-RHS] λ =  1.27 0.000 -13.95 
θ, λ = 1 [LHS-LIN] θ =  0.00 0.994 63.69 
θ = λ = 0 [LOG-LOG] --- --- 63.33 
θ = λ = 1 [LIN-LIN] --- --- -14.30 
θ = 0, λ [LOG-RHS] λ =   0.50 0.000 68.72 
θ, λ = 0 [LHS-LOG] θ = - 0.06 0.471 63.60 
Note: we report p-values of the null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to 0. 
 
 
Table 5. Comparison among reputation (LS) specifications by LR test 
 Model [.]  versus  Model [.] χ2-statistic P-value 
[LAMBDA]  versus  [THETA] 10.53 0.001 
[LIN-RHS]  versus  [THETA] 165.66 0.000 
[LHS-LIN]  versus  [THETA] 10.37 0.001 
[LOG-LOG]  versus  [THETA] 11.09 0.001 
[LIN-LIN]  versus  [THETA] 166.35 0.000 
[LOG-RHS]  versus  [THETA] 0.32 0.571 
[LHS-LOG]  versus  [THETA] 10.56 0.001 
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Table 6. Coefficient estimates of the general and restricted CVL and LS preferred models. 
Variable General CVL [LAMBDA] 
Restricted CVL 
[LAMBDA] 
General LS  
[LOG-RHS] 
Restricted LS 
[LOG-RHS] 
AN97 0.104 
(0.000) 
0.115 
(0.000) 
0.063 
(0.002) 
0.073 
(0.000) 
TYPE 0.075 (0.010) 
0.067 
(0.020) 
0.068 
(0.001) 
0.068 
(0.001) 
ALC 0.985 (0.667) --- 
0.117 
(0.312) --- 
DEN 0.286 (0.000) 
0.301 
(0.000) 
0.154 
(0.000) 
0.166 
(0.000) 
BARR 0.038 (0.176) --- 
0.036 
(0.069) 
0.045 
(0.018) 
BOTT 0.102 (0.037) 
0.102 
(0.037) 
- 0.011 
(0.000) 
- 0.011 
(0.000) 
INTE 0.016 (0.514) --- --- --- 
FINE 0.037 (0.365) --- --- --- 
COMP - 0.042 (0.239) --- --- --- 
HARM 0.120 (0.000) 
0.140 
(0.000) --- --- 
TANI 0.011 (0.758) --- --- --- 
FINI 0.024 (0.336) --- --- --- 
ECGAM --- --- 0.083 (0.005) 
0.085 
(0.005) 
ECMAR --- --- 0.113 (0.000) 
0.114 
(0.000) 
ECVER --- --- 0.093 (0.000) 
0.100 
(0.000) 
FIT --- --- 0.039 (0.000) 
0.043 
(0.000) 
PREST --- --- 0.015 (0.000) 
0.015 
(0.000) 
FAMA --- --- 0.383 (0.000) 
0.389 
(0.000) 
VSPE --- --- 0.034 
(0.147) 
--- 
Box-Cox parameter - 0.515 - 0.521 0.503 0.497 
Log L - 153.69 - 157.15 68.72 66.96 
Note: the dependent variable is the wine price (p). The number of observations is 603. P-values of 
the null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to 0 are reported in brackets. 
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Table 7. Marginal effects on price 
Variable Restricted CVL [LAMBDA] 
Restricted LS 
[LOG-RHS] 
AN97 3.25 (0.77) 2.08 (0.56) 
TYPE 1.80 (0.87) 1.91 (0.61) 
DEN 7.18 (0.84) 4.46 (0.81) 
BOTT 0.04 (0.02) -0.08 (0.02) 
HARM 4.34 (0.78) --- 
BARR --- 1.28 (0.59) 
ECGAM --- 2.47 (0.84) 
ECMAR --- 3.36 (0.86) 
ECVER --- 2.90 (0.63) 
FIT --- 0.59 (0.09) 
PREST --- 0.07 (0.001) 
FAMA --- 12.77 (1.41) 
Note: Marginal effects have been computed by using the smearing technique, as 
suggested by Abrevaya (2002). Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 
replications are reported in round brackets. 
As for the CVL model, marginal effects are computed at the mean value of the 
regressors (except for HARM, computed at HARM = 2). For dummy variables 
(except HARM) the effect represents the difference in the expected value of the 
dependent variable when the dummy changes from 0 to 1 (from 2 to 3 for 
HARM). 
In the LS model, effects have been computed at the mean value of all 
regressors. For dummy variables the effect represents the difference in the 
expected value of the dependent variable when the dummy changes from 0 to 1. 
 
Table 8. Comparison among restricted CLV and LS models by Vuong (1989) test 
LS [LOG-RHS] versus CLV [LAMBDA] VALR-statistics a P-value 
Correction factor:   
- Hannan and Quinn 6.636 0.000 
- Akaike 6.630 0.000 
- Schwarz 6.432 0.000 
a These statistics are distributed as a N (0,1) under the null hypothesis that the two models are 
equally distant to the true model. 
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